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Abstract
The Secretary of Health and Human Services acting through the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and in collaboration with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and Office of the National Coordinator for Health IT (ONC) was tasked with delivering a report on an appropriate, risk-based regulatory framework for health information technology. An expert stakeholder group was established under the auspices of the Health Information Technology (IT) Policy Committee to help provide input into the development of this framework. The three agencies were asked to take into account this input, and to use it to help Health and Human Services put forward a risk-based regulatory framework, including how healthcare IT systems could be stratified in terms of risk, and recommendations about how the regulatory requirements currently in place should be adapted. In this paper, we summarize the public deliberations and final public report of the expert stakeholder group, and conclude with key suggestions intended to address the charge to recommend the features of a risk-based regulatory framework that promote innovation, protect patient safety, and avoid regulatory duplication.
Perspective
On the 9 th of July 2012, President Barack Obama signed into law the Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act (FDASIA app were all given as examples of Health IT products that could possibly be subject to a riskbased regulatory framework, whereas disease registries and claims processing software were considered out-of-scope (Table 1) .
How can Health IT be stratified in terms of risk?
The FDASIA working group developed a new framework enumerating various important factors that could influence the potential risk of patient harm (combination of the probability of occurrence of harm and the severity of that harm). These included, for example, the purpose of the software product; intended user(s); severity of injury; likelihood of hazardous situation arising; and complexity of implementation and upgrades (see Table 2 ).
The framework did not weight or "calculate" any specific risk score for a given product, but rather served to highlight the key considerations when evaluating the use of a new system.
The matrix characterized the relative risk (i.e., "lower risk", "medium risk", or "higher risk") of certain conditions of each risk factor and served as directional guidance only. Software 6 may be considered complex in terms of implementation, upgrades and maintenance, and thus considered harder to classify. This was somewhat understandable given: (i) the greater effort and expertise required to implement this software, (ii) their variable context of use, and (iii) the existence of numerous interfaces to other systems. Furthermore, it is difficult to determine when a product is in final form, and balance the risk that arises from installation and implementation issues with that inherent at the product inception. For example, the "build" and configuration of an EHRs was considered complex and assigned a 'higher risk'
(e.g., greater number of people exposed and number of processes involved) compared to that of a closed-loop insulin pump with implanted continuous glucose monitor, which was assigned a 'medium risk'. Automated decision-making, which is synonymous with intelligent intravenous (IV) pumps, was also considered complex and assigned a 'higher risk' compared to that of a mHealth Nutrition app, which provided information only and was assigned a 'lower risk'.
What current regulatory frameworks are in place?
The 
Future directions
The next step will be for Health and Human Services to release its report for public commentary. This report is of great significance to the health informatics community as it paves the way for possible risk-based regulation of Health IT in the coming years and for reducing barriers to innovation. The HIT industry also has a great deal of interest in the recommendations. Too much regulation could stifle innovation, while if little oversight is put in place, safety issues may remain uncorrected.(6) While HIT is likely highly beneficial in the aggregate with respect to safety, numerous untended consequences have been identified of HIT, (7) and it does not necessarily result in desired benefits.
It remains to be seen which, if any, of the recommendations the federal agencies will take on board and the likely impact such a report will have on the future Health IT agenda.
We await the next developments with interest.
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Complexity of software and its maintenance
Application of mature, widely adopted technologies with information output that is easy to understand by the user Medium complexity. Testing procedures exist that reliably assess patient-safety risk profile of product.
Complexity of data collection and "transformation" involved in producing output is significant. Difficult to test reliably for all safety risks
Complexity of implementation and upgrades
The "build" and configuration of the software is straightforward and does not materially affect the integrity of the output. Safety upgrades can be accomplished easily.
The "build" and configuration of the software is moderately complex, but "guard rails" significantly limit types of changes that might induce lifethreatening risk.
The "build" and configuration of the software is complex and can introduce substantial changes that can induce serious risk. Limited or no "guard rails."
Complexity of training and use
The software system output is clear and easy to interpret. Minimal training needed.
Moderate complexity. Less than 2 hr of training required.
The complexity of the user interface and density of data presented can cause important errors or oversights that can lead to serious risk. Formal training necessary. Use as part of more comprehensive software/hardware system Used as a standalone product, or output is unambiguously used as part of larger integrated system. Certified to specific hardware. Redundancy reduces single points of failure.
Software interacts with 1-3 other systems with mature, well described interfaces.
Almost always used as part of a larger software system AND output is subject to interpretation or can be configured in multiple ways whose mis-interpretation may induce harm (e.g., DDI thresholds) Network connectivity, standards, security
Wired and wireless licensed spectrum
Wireless spectrum that is licensed by rule with interference protection and low risk of harmful interference.
Wireless unlicensed spectrum, which has no protection from harmful interference.
